Training and the Private Sector: International Comparisons by Lisa M. Lynch
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Training and the Private Sector
Volume Author/Editor: Lisa M. Lynch
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-49810-7
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/lync94-1
Conference Date: December 15-17, 1991
Publication Date: January 1994
Chapter Title: Introduction to "Training and the Private Sector"
Chapter Author: Lisa M. Lynch
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c8775
Chapter pages in book: (p. 1 - 24)Introduction 
Lisa M. Lynch 
Between 1983 and 1989 the average annual growth rate in GDP per person in 
employment was 1.3 percent in the United States, 2.4 percent in Germany and 
France, and 3.4 percent in Japan. The fact that U.S. labor productivity growth 
continues to lag behind that of  some of  its major economic competitors has 
renewed interest in how  to stimulate the skill development of  the American 
work force. For example, in  1989, the secretary of  labor’s  Commission on 
Workforce Quality and Labor Market Efficiency concluded that in order for 
U.S. firms to compete internationally immediate reforms would be needed in 
the educational and training institutions in America. Why is there this percep- 
tion that the skills of U.S. workers are not on par with the skills of workers in 
Europe and Japan? One possible explanation is that educational quality has 
declined markedly in the United States and new entrants are not as well pre- 
pared as previous generations were. In international comparisons of  achieve- 
ment tests given to youths, U.S. youths score lower than young people in many 
other countries in a variety of subjects (see Bishop 1992). However, since most 
workers are already in the labor market, changes in the quality of the newest 
entrants in the past ten to fifteen years would have only a minor impact on the 
overall quality of the work force. 
A second possible explanation is dramatic change in the demand for work- 
ers’ skills that has left those without a college degree at a disadvantage. In the 
past, many workers without a college degree could look forward to a good- 
paying job with moderate skill requirements in the manufacturing sector. The 
necessary skills could be acquired through a system of informal “leaming-by- 
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doing.’’ However, as technologies changed and new work organizations were 
designed to increase productivity, the need for cross-functional competencies 
and problem solving increased, as did the demand for multiskilled workers. 
Nonmanagerial workers are now expected to take on responsibilities for qual- 
ity control and trouble shooting that were not associated with old, Fordist pro- 
duction systems. Leaner work organizations require workers to have a broader 
range of  skills, and, given technological changes, many workers, even if they 
remain with the same employer, will not be working in the same  jobs ten years 
from now. The requisite new skills are not easy to acquire informally, and they 
require a strong base of analytical, quantitative, and verbal skills that college 
graduates are more likely to have than are high school graduates. This may 
explain the large increase in the 1980s in the differential between earnings of 
U.S. high school graduates and those of college graduates (see Freeman and 
Katz 1993). 
So work-force requirements are changing: workers must be retrainable and 
adaptable to new technologies and work organizations. But how do workers 
who have already completed their formal education acquire these new skills? 
In addition, how do new entrants, especially those without a college degree, 
make sure that they are prepared enough to obtain a high-skillhigh-wage job, 
as opposed to a low-skilMow-wage job, when they enter the labor market? 
These questions suggest that explanations of the U.S.  training deficit need to 
examine the institutional process behind the skill development of new entrants 
in the labor market and how workers already in the labor force acquire the new 
skills needed by their employers. 
While there seems to be an emerging consensus that US. workers’  skills 
are not on par with those of European  and Japanese workers (U.S. General 
Accounting Office (GAO) 1990; US. Congress Office of Technology Assess- 
ment (OTA) 1990; Lynch 1991a, 1993; Kochan and Osterman 1991), this con- 
sensus is based on limited direct empirical evidence of  how skills and skill 
preparation vary from country to country. We have relatively good documenta- 
tion of how education and government training programs affect labor market 
outcomes but much less direct evidence on how private-sector training affects 
wages and productivity. This volume seeks to inform the current discussion of 
training and competitiveness by examining new empirical evidence on what 
returns training provides for workers and firms, across countries. 
In particular, the volume seeks to address the following questions: (1) How 
does the structure of  training systems vary  across countries? (2) How much 
does the amount of training provided by the private sector vary across coun- 
tries? (3) What other institutional structures support these training systems, 
especially in Germany and Japan? (4) What impact does training have on firm 
productivity? (5) Who receives training, and how do different types of training 
affect workers’ wages and wage growth? No single paper in this volume ad- 
dresses all of these questions, but each paper addresses at least one. This vol- 
ume is a compilation, so that each of the papers was written and can be read 3  Introduction 
independently. While some of  the papers  are comparative and others focus 
on a single country, they can be grouped according to three major themes- 
alternative training  systems, training  outcomes for firms, and training  out- 
comes for individuals. This introduction presents an overview of the key issues 
surrounding the role of the private sector in the provision of training and puts 
in some perspective the major findings of the following chapters in the volume. 
Chapters 1 through 4 present detailed studies of the training systems in Ger- 
many, Japan, and the United Kingdom and contrast them with the training sys- 
tem in the United States. Chapters 5 and 6 analyze the impact of formal and 
informal training on productivity in U.S. firms. Chapters 7 through 11 examine 
who receives training and the impact of different training systems on workers’ 
wages in the United States and Europe. 
The Structure of Alternative Training Systems 
If there is an emerging consensus in the United States that training is neces- 
sary for competitiveness, why isn’t everyone doing more of it? Part of the an- 
swer is related to the complex nature of the investment decision. Workplace 
training is different from other forms of human capital investment, such as 
education and government training, since there are two parties in the training 
decision-the  individual (who may or may not be represented by a union) and 
the firm. These two agents may differ greatly in their levels of risk aversion, 
time horizons, information about the labor market, access to capital markets, 
and preferences. Therefore, we need to examine reasons why these two parties 
do or do not invest in training. 
Firms may not provide more training, especially more general training, even 
though they might wish to do so, for a variety of reasons. For example, a firm 
may be reluctant to invest in training if employee turnover is high. In addition, 
training may itself contribute to employee turnover: if new skills are of value 
to other employers, the firm risks having the trained employee hired away (the 
poaching or “cherry-picking’’ problem). Therefore, investments in nonportable 
firm-specific training are more attractive to firms than are investments in gen- 
eral training. This would not be a problem if capital markets were perfect and 
workers could borrow to finance more general training, if the state subsidized 
general training, or if employers could pay workers lower wages during the 
general training periods. However, capital markets are far from perfect,  and 
workers differ from firms in their levels of  risk aversion; other institutional 
constraints may also result in a market failure to provide general training. 
Smaller firms often have higher training costs per employee than larger firms 
because they cannot spread fixed costs of training over a large group of em- 
ployees. In addition, the loss in production from having one worker in off-site 
training is probably much higher for a small firm than for a larger firm. The 
result is that the percentage of workers with company training in the United 
States is much lower for small firms than for large ones: 26 percent of workers 4  Lisa M. Lynch 
in large establishments report receiving formal company training, compared to 
11 percent in small establishments (see Bowers and Swaim 1992). 
Japan seems to have gotten around this problem of capturing the returns to 
training by  imposing high costs on employees who quit a firm. Wage gains 
associated with tenure at a firm  are four times greater in Japan than in the 
United States, so that wage gains to quitters are low (see Mincer and Higuchi 
1988). In addition, firms are reluctant to hire workers away from other firms 
because the social costs paid by  poaching firms have historically been high. 
This is one reason average employee tenure in Japan is much higher than in 
other developed economies. When product demand falls, Japanese firms are 
less likely to lay  off workers than are their US. counterparts. Instead, they 
often use periods of  slack demand to do more worker training. With lower 
employee turnover, firms are able to capture the returns to investments in even 
more general training. However, the ability of this system to sustain itself may 
be challenged as employee turnover in sectors such as finance and banking 
increases. It will be interesting to see what impact this change has on the train- 
ing strategies firms in these sectors pursue in the future. 
Germany’s tripartite  structure  of  employers, unions,  and the government 
jointly determines a national strategy for training; this arrangement also ap- 
pears to have solved the problem of capturing returns to training. Local cham- 
bers of commerce use moral suasion to protect firms training a large number 
of workers from excessive poaching. More generally, the German dual system 
of  apprenticeship training  is  characterized  by  coinvestment  in  training  by 
workers and firms, by codetermination of training program content by unions, 
employer associations, and the government, and by nationally recognized certi- 
fication of skills on completion of training. As a result of these three compo- 
nents, German firms undertake a great deal of  general skill training, and this 
generates a high-skill, high-productivity equilibrium. 
Sweden and other Nordic countries have historically addressed the potential 
market failure in general training differently, through support for government 
training. This may be in the form of government-sponsored training programs 
in institutions  developed solely for this purpose or school-based  vocational 
training as found in Norway. Regardless of the form of delivery of government 
training programs,  the expenditures are much  larger than what is spent on 
government-sponsored training in the United States. For example, in 1990 the 
Swedish government spent approximately 0.46 percent of GDP on training 
programs, in contrast to just 0.09 percent spent by the U.S. government. 
While this strategy may help to solve a market failure, it can be costly if the 
government also finances firm-specific training. There has also been mixed 
evidence on the effectiveness of government training programs on the employ- 
ment experience of workers (see Bjorklund 1990). There is concern in Sweden 
that government programs are not improving workers’ skills appropriately to 
meet private-sector demand and that some workers may be stigmatized by par- 
ticipating in government training programs. This latter concern has also been 5  Introduction 
raised in the U.S.  discussion of the effectiveness of such programs. As a result 
of increasing pressure to reduce government expenditures and of  the mixed 
evidence  about how  much government programs  actually  improve workers 
skills, the Swedish government is considering several proposals targeted at in- 
creasing private-sector training expenditures and decreasing public expendi- 
tures. 
Some of the current policy debate in the United States has focused on the 
relative merits of  imposing an employer’s training tax to generate additional 
training, similar to taxes imposed in France and Australia. An employer’s train- 
ing tax for firms with more than  10 employees has been in place in France 
since 1971. Initially the tax rate was 0.8 percent of the total wage bill; it rose 
to 1.2 percent in 1988 and is currently 1.4 percent. This tax is called a “pay or 
play” tax since what is required is the expenditure not the training. Conse- 
quently, if a firm is not able to document training expenses greater than  1.4 
percent  of  its wage bill, it must pay the difference between  actual training 
expenditures and  1.4 percent of the wage bill. In  1990, Australia adopted a 
similar training tax, called the Training Guarantee. All enterprises that have a 
payroll greater than A$200,000  must spend  1.5 percent  of their payroll on 
training. 
While there has been only limited evaluation of the impact of the training 
tax in France (and none in Australia, since the tax was just instituted), it is 
possible to examine how effective the French training tax has been in stimulat- 
ing training, especially in small firms and for unskilled workers. Table 1 pre- 
sents results from a survey of training practices of French firms in 1988 after 
the 1987 increase in the tax rate, from 0.8 to 1.2 percent. As shown here, even 
with the training tax, most formal company-provided training is still concen- 
trated in large firms and among technical, managerial, and professional em- 
ployees. What this table does not reveal is what proportion of unskilled work- 
ers or workers  in  smaller firms have  taken  advantage  of  public-supported 
training institutions or received formal training from a previous employer. Nev- 
ertheless, the efforts to stimulate training through a tax seem to have had an 
Table 1  Proportion of Salaried Employees in Training: France, 1988 (%) 
Firm Size (number of employees) 
Skill Level  10-19  20-49  50-499  500-1,999  2,000+  Total 
Unskilled  2  3  9  15  24  12 
Skilled  4  6  14  23  41  21 
Nonmanual  9  12  22  33  44  25 
Managerial, technical, 
and professional  14  20  35  53  67  47 
Total  8  11  21  34  49  29 
Source: Centre d’Etudes et des Recherches sur les Qualifications (CEREQ) (1991). 6  Lisa M. Lynch 
uneven impact on the distribution of company-provided training across work- 
ers and firms. 
The U.S. training system, in contrast to the European and the Japanese, is 
highly decentralized and has little formal structure (for overviews of the U.S. 
training  system, see Camevale, Gainer, and Villet 1990; Carey  1985; Luster- 
man 1977; U.S. Congress OTA  1990). Many groups offer postschool training, 
and no national system exists for accrediting vocational skills acquired outside 
formal schooling. Why do we not have training institutions as well developed 
as those in Europe or Japan? A small part of the answer may lie in how U.S. 
firms filled their training requirements in the past. When U.S. employers faced 
a specific skill shortage, the government could increase the immigration flow 
of the necessary skilled workers. One consequence of this practice was a fail- 
ure  to develop training and retraining  institutions within  the United  States. 
Importing skilled labor has real benefits, but the need for workers with general 
skills and the lack of well-developed and integrated domestic training institu- 
tions means that it is difficult to continue to depend on that strategy. 
Another reason postschool training is so decentralized in the United States 
may be that our schooling system is itself so decentralized; compared to those 
of Europe and Japan, our schools have an unusually high degree of local and 
state autonomy  in  schooling  standards. This  structure is then  replicated  in 
postschool  training  institutions. More  generally, one might characterize the 
US. training  system as one in which training needs are filled by individual 
workers’ or individual firms’ decisions to invest or not. This results in a train- 
ing system which is flexible at the individual level. However, at the national 
level, there is not a comprehensive strategy to develop and coordinate these 
individual training investments to address potential market failures in the deliv- 
ery of more general training. 
Finally, it could be argued that a simple explanation for the decentralization 
of  the US. training  system is the sheer size of the U.S. work force (almost 
140 million) relative to the work forces of Japan (63 million) or the individual 
European  countries  (e.g., former  West  Germany, 29 million).  As a  conse- 
quence of our large and geographically dispersed labor force, it is much harder 
to coordinate training efforts. However, in spite of language barriers and differ- 
ences in the training delivery systems, the European Community (143 million 
in the labor force in  1989) is attempting to improve the coordination of skill 
development in member countries, to facilitate greater portability and recogni- 
tion of skills across countries. It is hoped that this increased coordination will 
foster more rapid economic growth within Europe. So size alone does not seem 
to be an insurmountable barrier to the development of a comprehensive train- 
ing strategy. 
The various training  strategies pursued by firms in the United States, Eu- 
rope, and Japan are summarized in table 2. The table highlights some of the 
unique  characteristics  of  each  system  and  shows the  large  variance  across 
countries in their approaches to meeting the skill requirements of their work 7  Introduction 
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Table 2  Alternative Training Systems 
System  Country  Basic Characteristicsfissues 
Apprenticeship training 
















United States, Canada 
Codetennination (employers, unions, and 
Coinvestment 
Certification of  skills 
Incentives for all to do well in school 
Lifetime employment lowers turnover 
Firms provide general and specific 
Training embedded in production 
High degree of  homogeneity in literacy 
Government-funded general training 
Government may also fund firm-specific 
Relevance of  school-based programs 
Distributes costs over wide range of 
Does not guarantee training of unskilled 
Individual autonomy on training 
Multiple sources of training 
Few nationally recognized qualifications 
outside formal schooling 








and those in small firms 
investments 
forces. There are a variety of contributory factors which might explain why we 
see, as shown in table 2, such a range of training systems across countries. For 
example, Oulton and Steedman (chap. 2 in this volume) present a theoretical 
model that shows how there can be various training equilibriums across differ- 
ent countries. In particular, they examine the different training equilibriums in 
Germany, the United Kingdom, and France. They argue that there are three 
important components to training investments: how and by whom training is 
financed, what it contains, and how it is assessed and certified. They conclude 
that the traditional apprenticeship systems (such as those in Britain and the 
United States) have failed to provide sufficient training, compared with Ger- 
many, because wages for apprentices are too high during training periods. In 
addition, when the British government attempted in the 1980s to establish a 
new training system for all unemployed young workers, it failed because the 
new training system appears to provide little value to the trainees. The reasons 
for this failure are threefold: the skill levels required for skill certificates asso- 
ciated with the new training programs are low, the certificates are too industry 8  Lisa M. Lynch 
specific, and there is no reliable measure of an individual’s actual workplace 
skills. As a result, trainees are not willing to accept the same reduction  in 
wages that German apprentices accept. Therefore, since new entrant wages are 
still higher in Britain than in Germany, British employers provide less training, 
and the training is more firm specific. 
In contrast, training standards are high in Germany, the assessment standards 
that have evolved over the years are viewed as very reliable, and the content 
includes a general educational element. Consequently, young people in Ger- 
many find training much more attractive than do those in the United Kingdom. 
As a result (as Soskice describes in chap. l), youths are willing to work hard 
in school to get the better apprenticeships and then to accept lower wages dur- 
ing the apprenticeship. The lower wages allow firms to provide more general 
training, and a virtuous circle is created. So in the 1980s, while the United 
Kingdom moved away  from apprenticeship training, Germany expanded its 
program. The French experience lies between the British and German experi- 
ences. 
Oulton and Steedman’s model also suggests why it is difficult for a single 
firm in the United States or the United Kingdom to move out of one training 
equilibrium and into another. If a firm provides more general training but there 
is no accepted national system to recognize and certify general skills for other 
employers, as in Germany or France, then workers will not be willing to accept 
lower wages during training. As a result,  a country becomes  locked into a 
lower training equilibrium even when individual firms are willing to invest in 
more general training. 
The Japanese training system appears to work much differently: Lifetime 
employment (especially for male workers), which is more common in Japan 
than in other countries, means that general training is feasible even without 
vastly lower trainee wages. With lower employee turnover, firms are able to 
capture the returns on even more general forms of human capital investments. 
There is not an apprenticeship system-as  found in Germany, the Netherlands, 
or France-in  Japan. In fact an apprenticeship system would be contrary to a 
fundamental premise of the Japanese system-loyalty  to a firm  as opposed to 
a specific job or occupation. 
In chapter 4 of this volume, Hashimoto distinguishes between two types of 
complementary training in Japan: training in technical skills and training in 
employment relations. In particular, he emphasizes that one major difference 
between Japanese and U.S. training strategies is Japan’s focus on producing in 
the schools a high degree of homogeneity in literacy and numeracy, willingness 
to learn and teach new skills, and ability to function as team members. This 
focus lowers the cost of investment in both technical and employment rela- 
tions.  As in  Germany, school performance is  very  important  in  detennin- 
ing postschool employment opportunities; many firms establish explicit rela- 
tionships with certain schools to help in their recruitment of new employees. 
Hashimoto argues that, because of the high level of basic knowledge that the 9  Introduction 
work force shares, firms can rely to a large degree on more informal learning 
and on individual study for technical training. So, more informal learning is 
not inconsistent with new work organizations per se. The key is the high level 
of fundamental skills possessed by workers coming into the workplace, skills 
that firms can then build upon. This suggests that key features of the Japanese 
training system include both lower employee turnover and a high level of pre- 
labor-market-entry general skills. 
How Does the Amount of Postschool Training Vary across Countries? 
While the focus of this volume is primarily on postschool training provided 
by the private sector, other forms of human capital investments, such as school- 
ing, are obviously closely linked to these training investments. What happens 
in schools influences what employers must do and how much it will cost to 
achieve the skill quality they want from new entrants into the labor market. 
Patterns of schooling vary substantially across the United States, Europe, and 
Japan. Table 3 summarizes some of the basic differences in the education and 
training structures for young workers across a group of countries. As the col- 
umn 1 shows, a very high percentage of young workers in Germany follow a 
vocational education track in school; 70 percent of German youths participate 
in apprenticeship schemes that combine on-the-job work and training with off- 
site classroom training. Only 30 percent of U.S. youths are in any type of voca- 
tional education, and even fewer are in apprenticeships. Although only 3 per- 
cent of non-college-bound youths begin an apprenticeship in the United States 
(see Blanchflower and Lynch, chap. 8 in this volume; Lynch 1992b), as column 
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hY  University or 
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Schooling  Collegen 








57  36 
30  26 
21  8 
50  27 
37  26 
30  24 
23  18 
Sources:  Various  sources, but primarily US. GAO (1990,  12). Franch data are from CEREQ 
(1991). 
"First-year enrollment in schools conferring baccalaureate degrees, or higher. 
bData refer to 1990 activities of  18-year-olds, from Department of  Education and Training, Can- 
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2 of table 3 shows, in the United States the percentage of youths that go on to 
postsecondary education is much higher than in other countries. This reflects 
a positive aspect of our education and training system; individuals have more 
flexibility to get onto an  academic track  at a later stage in their lives. The 
difference across countries in postsecondary education narrows but remains, 
when  one examines first-year enrollment  rates in four-year universities  and 
their equivalents (col. 3 of table 3).  However, since graduation rates from U.S. 
universities granting a baccalaureate or its equivalent are only approximately 
25 percent, there is not such a wide difference across countries in the supply 
of  college graduates (with the exception of  the United Kingdom, where the 
supply is lower). 
While important differences in the structure of education exist across coun- 
tries, there are even wider differences in how the various systems of postschool 
training affect workers. Table 4 presents rough measures of the percentage of 
employed workers that receive training  at their firm. Unfortunately, the time 
period over which this incidence is measured varies from country to country. 
For example, in the United States the incidence refers to the percentage that 
ever received formal training from their current employer, while the Japanese 
data refer to training in the past two years (see OECD (199 1, annex 5a)). How- 
ever, even though these numbers are not easily comparable across countries, 
there are some interesting cross-country differences. The most striking is that, 
even if workers are allowed to report any training they ever received in their 
current job instead of only training received in the past year or two, U.S. work- 
ers seem to receive much less formal training than workers in most other coun- 
tries. These numbers reveal only part of the picture of the variation in training 
incidence across countries. For example, in Germany, as shown in table 4, ap- 
proximately  13 percent of all workers receive training over a survey period of 
one month, but as shown in table 3, over three-quarters of  all youths are in 
training in this survey period. In the German training system, large investments 
in skill development are made very early in  a worker’s career, with limited 
additional training after completion of an apprenticeship. Meanwhile, in Japan 
and Sweden, training is concentrated in workers who are 30 to 44 years of age 
and who have worked at the firm for a longer period of time. So some countries 
seem to concentrate their training at the beginning of workers’ careers, while 
others follow a more curvilinear relationship. 
The numbers in table 4 do not shed much light on who actually receives 
training.  The people in the United States who receive training are primarily 
technical and managerial employees with university degrees (for details on the 
occupational distribution of training, see Bartel 1989). Only 4 percent of young 
workers who are not university graduates get formal training at work (for fur- 
ther  details, see Lynch  1991b, 1992b). More generally, nonmanagerial  and 
nontechnical workers receive very little skill-enhancing, formal training in the 
United States compared to their counterparts in Europe and Japan. Most train- 
ing for these workers is obtained informally, as learning-by-doing. 11  Introduction 
Table 4  Enterprise-Related  Training 
Country  Individuals Receiving Formal Training (W) 
United States: 1983 
1991 
Canada: 1985 
West Germany: 1989 


















Sources: Current Population Survey, Training Supplement (Washington, D.C.:  U.S. Department of 
Labor, 1983, 1991); OECD (1991); CEREQ (1991); 1985 Adult Training Survey (Ottawa: Statis- 
tics Canada, 1986). 
'Received training at any time in current job. 
bOf  all employed workers. 
cOf all workers in firms employing  10 or more employees. 
dReceived training within the past two years. 
'Received in-house training. 
Because training is more informal in the United States than in Europe, one 
might conclude that U.S. firms do not spend as much on training as firms in 
other countries do. Measuring actual expenditures, however, is not straightfor- 
ward. Training costs for firms can include direct costs such as materials, teach- 
ers'  salaries, transportation, and other items associated with off-site training. 
Training costs for workers are primarily forgone earnings. The treatment of 
trainee  wages,  however, is problematic.  The issue,  as discussed by  Mincer 
(1962), is whether  all or just part  of  firm training  expenditures  should be 
counted  as training costs if workers are also receiving  lower wages during 
training periods. If the reduction in wages is exactly equal to the firm's training 
costs, then the worker bears all the training costs, not the firm. However, it is 
more likely that firms recover a large part of their training expenditures well 
after workers complete their training. These expenditures should be included 
in the direct training costs of firms. This accounting procedure would not auto- 
matically include all trainee wages in firm training costs, yet this is common 
practice in  the measurement  of  training  costs across countries. In addition, 
perhaps a larger share of costs is indirect: it results from lost output of trainees 
or of coworkers or supervisors during time spent training new hires. Because 
of measurement difficulties,  these types of costs are usually  not included in 
overall training expenditures. In sum, this discussion suggests that measuring 
firms' actual training expenditures is not straightforward. 
Finally, it is important to note that, because of the difficulty in measuring 
both direct and indirect training expenditures by  firms, there is no standard 12  Lisa M. Lynch 
accounting  procedure  across  countries for measuring  firms'  training  costs. 
Given this important caveat, table 5 presents Organisation for Economic Coop- 
eration and Development (OECD 1991) calculations of firms' training expen- 
ditures.  On  average, in  the  United  States (for  larger  firms), Germany, the 
United Kingdom, France, and Australia, it seems that firms are all spending 
roughly 1.5 percent or more of their total wage bill on training. 
The only exception is Japan, where it appears that only 0.4 percent is spent 
on training. Most of the discrepancy between the reported numbers for Japan 
and those for the other countries exists because the Japanese cost numbers do 
not include trainee wages. In addition, time that supervisors spend training 
workers is not included, since only direct costs associated with off-site training 
are included. In fact, the apparently low numbers for Japan may actually show 
how successful Japanese firms have been in incorporating training into the pro- 
duction process. 
While tables 3,4,  and 5 provide a general sense of cross-country variations 
in training, they may not fully reflect the reality of cross-country differences 
in postschool training. In'particular, these numbers do no reveal the huge gap 
in spending that much of the popular discussion on U.S. training deficiencies 
would suggest. What might explain this apparent paradox? Another approach 
to studying training is to focus on specific industries and occupations across 
countries and to examine how workers are trained. This more micro, firm- 
based case-study approach can reveal differences in training content that may 
be more important in  the competitiveness  debate than crude, cross-country 
comparisons of expenditures. Tables 6 and 7 present firm data on two indus- 
tries-automobiles  and nuclear power. In the auto industry, Krafcik (1990) 
found that the average worker in Japan or in a Japanese-owned U.S. plant spent 
two to three times as much time being trained as a worker in a U.S.-owned 
Table 5  Training Expenditures by Firms 
Country  Average Training Expenditure (as % of  total wage bill) 
United States: 1988 
Canada: 1985 
West Germany: 1984 















Sources: OECD (1991); for U.S. data Training Magazine (Alexandria, Va.:  American Society for 
Training and Development, 1988); for Canadian data, Adult Training Survey (Ottawa: Statistics 
Canada, 1986). as reported by the Canadian Labour Market and Productivity Centre. 
"Includes larger firms from Training Magazine survey. 
bTraining  expenditures as a percentage of monthly labor costs, but excludes trainees' wages. 13  Introduction 
Table 6  Studies of Average Hours of ’lkaining: Auto Industry 
Qpe  of Plant 
Worker  Japanese  Japanese-owned transplant  US.-owned 
All workers  85  55  30 
New-hire assembly workers  310  280  48 
Source: Krafcik (1990). 
plant (see row 1 of table 6). These average numbers do not control for age and 
experience; the smaller number of  training hours in U.S.-owned plants may 
result from the work force’s being older and more experienced here than in 
Japan or in the Japanese transplants. However, row 2 shows that, for new as- 
sembly workers, the gap across the three types of plants is even greater. New 
hires in Japan or in Japanese transplants receive approximately 300 hours of 
training, while their U.S. counterparts receive only 48 hours of training. 
In chapter 3 of this volume Berg presents detailed comparisons of training 
in U.S. and German auto plants. Berg argues that, in the auto industry, training 
for both skilled and unskilled workers can be divided into three main catego- 
ries: product and process awareness training, teamwork training, and technical 
training. In the first two forms of training there is little difference across U.S. 
and German auto firms. Indeed, U.S. workers spend slightly more time in prod- 
uct awareness training than their German counterparts. But these two types of 
training constitute a very small proportion of overall training. Most employee 
development is in technical training, and here there are large differences across 
the United States and Germany. German firms spend 1.5 to 10 times more time 
in technical training than comparable U.S. firms. However, even in Germany 
there are wide differences among firms. In fact, German firms that provide less 
technical training are characterized by less employee flexibility and look more 
like U.S. auto firms. Firms in either country that provide considerable training 
appear to be able to deploy their workers more flexibly at the workplace. 
While the auto industry is an appealing industry to study because we have 
accurately measured inputs and outputs, it is not particularly representative of 
industry as a whole. Mason’s study (1990) on cross-country differences in nu- 
clear power industry training provides insight into a very different sector- 
one that is interesting partly because the technology is identical in many coun- 
tries. It is also a highly regulated industry that spends large amounts on worker 
training to ensure the safe operation of facilities, and in the United States it is 
considered an industry with a highly developed training program. 
Mason’s study may  solve the paradox we have been noting: US. training 
expenditures are not smaller than those of other developed countries, and yet 
we sense a training deficit in the United States. It appears that workers in the 
US.  nuclear industry are receiving amounts of training similar to those re- 
ceived by their European counterparts (excluding German technicians in plant 14  Lisa M. Lynch 
Table 7 
Type of Training  Germany"  France  United States 
Totalb  560/1340  460  640 
Fundamentals, basic technology, and site familiarization  240/40  0  520 
Studies of Hours of Training: Nuclear Power Technicians 
Source: Mason (1990). 
SF&  number is for maintenance workers; second number is for plant-operations workers. 
bIncludes  fundamentals, basic technology, site familiarization, basic nuclear technology, plant SYS- 
tems, integrated operation, and administrative procedures. 
operations). However, half of all technician training in the US.  nuclear indus- 
try is spent on fundamentals (including remedial education), whereas Euro- 
pean technicians use training hours for much more advanced study of nuclear 
engineering and plant administration. This difference reflects the very different 
level of preparedness possessed by German and French workers coming into 
this  industry.  This curriculum  difference  may  affect  workers'  abilities  to 
respond  to  situations  outside  the  parameters  of  simulations  they  have 
been  trained  on.  In  addition,  firms  that  can  bypass  fundamental  training 
can hire fewer supervisors, since the more advanced training  allows techni- 
cians to work with less supervision. So, while the expenditures and hours may 
be  similar across countries, the content  and results  vary  dramatically. This 
factor may be an important part of the perceived training deficit in the United 
States. 
In summary, when we look at aggregate estimates of training across coun- 
tries, we are left with a mixed sense of the differences. On one hand, it appears 
that the United States does not spend less than other countries on training. On 
the other hand, there seem to be important differences in firms' training needs, 
depending on the initial skill level of  workers. These initial levels are influ- 
enced by the education that workers receive before entering the work force and 
by the training available to workers in the early years of their employment. SO, 
in some sectors, for the  same level of expenditures, U.S. firms do not end 
up with employees as well qualified as those of their European and Japanese 
competitors. Consequently,  underinvestment  in training  in the United States 
may take two forms. First, in certain sectors, U.S. firms may be spending less 
and providing their nontechnical or nonmanagerial employees with more lim- 
ited training than competitors in other countries. Second, in other sectors, the 
level of expenditures or number of training hours may be the same but, because 
of lower initial skill levels, still not sufficient to achieve the skill proficiencies 
found in countries such as Japan and Germany. 
Institutional Supports to Alternative Training Systems in Germany and 
Japan 
Training systems do not develop or operate in a vacuum. They can be sup- 
ported and influenced by a range of institutions. For example, one of the more 15  Introduction 
important characteristics that affects the evolution of the German training sys- 
tem is the percentage of the work force that is unionized and the role of unions 
in the organization of work. Union density in Germany in 1988 was over 40 
percent. Unions in Germany, through their legislatively mandated representa- 
tion on works councils in most firms, can be actively involved in codetermining 
with employers the content of apprenticeship training and retraining programs 
targeted at adult workers. In addition, Soskice argues in chapter 1 of this vol- 
ume that, in order to understand why and how German companies train work- 
ers, one must make a distinction between the training strategies that medium- 
sized and large firms pursue and those that smaller, artisanal companies pursue. 
These various training strategies are supported by a wide range of institutional 
structures, including the school system, banks, local chambers of commerce, 
employer associations, and works councils. 
More specifically, Soskice explains that there is a clear ranking in the quality 
and status of the various apprenticeships available. The better apprenticeships 
go to students who perform well in school, which gives students who are not 
preparing for university  an incentive to work hard. Larger firms with well- 
developed  internal labor  markets  carefully  select and  train  young  workers. 
They do this partly because bank lending policies allow firms to make longer- 
term investments and because local chambers of commerce work to minimize 
other firms’ poaching of  trained  workers. The local chambers of commerce 
provide valuable training expertise to firms and use moral suasion and social 
pressure to minimize poaching. The majority of apprentices in these firms re- 
main after completion of their apprenticeships. In contrast, in the artisanal sec- 
tor there is much higher apprentice turnover at the completion of training. Even 
with this high turnover, firms are still willing to hire apprentices because they 
can pay lower wages than they would for adult, unskilled labor. German trade 
unions’ success in obtaining high wages in larger firms has had two conse- 
quences for apprentice training. Larger firms pursue a high-quality, innovative 
product market strategy that requires a highly skilled work force, while firms 
in the artisanal sector maintain lower labor costs by hiring apprentices. 
In Japan, as in Germany, there is a set of institutions which  supports the 
training structures we observe. As already mentioned, there are established 
links between employers and schools. Students realize that through these links 
their school performance will influence their ability to obtain certain types of 
jobs. Schools in Japan do not focus on teaching technical skills; rather, they 
concentrate on developing math, science, reading, and what Hashimoto calls 
“citizenship skills.” Hashimoto argues in chapter 4 that these citizenship skills 
help workers  communicate  better  when  they  are members  of  teams  in  the 
workplace. 
Other institutional supports operate to sustain the Japanese training system. 
For  example,  the  government  subsidizes  in-house  training,  especially  for 
smaller firms. In addition, there is a national trade skill test system. These tests 
are set to government standards but are mainly in manufacturing and construc- 
tion. Passing these tests is not usually a condition of employment; however, 16  Lisa M. Lynch 
many firms provide special bonuses to workers who pass these examinations. 
Banks, as in Germany, have traditionally taken a longer view toward firms’ 
investments in R&D and training than have their U.S. counterparts. Finally, the 
well-documented links between large companies and their suppliers extend to 
training as well. Many large firms will train the workers of their smaller suppli- 
ers. This maintains quality standards in the large firms and overcomes con- 
straints smaller firms may face in training their own workers. 
If one component of the Japanese system is a high degree of  shared basic 
knowledge, how easy is it to transfer this training system to the United States? 
Hashimoto documents how Japanese auto transplants have adapted their train- 
ing system to function within the U.S. educational and training  structure. In 
particular,  he shows that, because there are no well-developed  relationships 
between  employers  and  schools,  Japanese  transplants  have  had  to  closely 
screen new  hires.  In addition, they have had to provide  much  more formal 
training than is required in Japan, both in technical skills and in employment 
relations skills. 
In summary, a variety of training equilibriums are supported by  a range of 
institutions including schools, banks, employer groups, and unions. The train- 
ing equilibrium is affected by the pattern  of  wages and the degree to which 
skills are certified. In particular, both Japan and Germany-through  very dif- 
ferent systems-have  been  able to create performance  incentives for youths 
who do not obtain a university degree. These countries have developed training 
institutions that appear to overcome the potential market failure in the provi- 
sion of general training. However, Japanese transplants preferred to modify the 
Japanese training system when operating in the United States rather than to try 
to replicate the Japanese system. Even with these modifications, the transplants 
(at least in the auto industry)  still devote on average more time to training 
workers than do most of their U.S. counterparts.’ 
Training Outcomes: Returns to Firms 
An underlying assumption in the current training debate in the United States 
is that the more rapid aggregate growth rates in German and Japanese manu- 
facturing labor productivity in the 1970s and 1980s  were in large part the result 
of the training systems described here. However, this assumption has not been 
tested. In  addition, no one has studied the impact of  training on productivity 
in nonmanufacturing sectors. Unfortunately, the primary reason this assump- 
tion has not been tested in Germany and Japan is the lack of a representative 
sample of firms that can provide information on their training  strategies and 
productivity. Fortunately, in the United States we are beginning to see more 
firm-based surveys, so that chapters 5 and 6 of this volume present new find- 
ings on training and firm productivity within the United States. 
1.  One important  exception  is  GM’s  Saturn plant,  where  there is  extensive training of  all 
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Before evaluating the returns to firm productivity due to formal training, it 
is useful to have a benchmark for the impact of traditional informal, learning- 
by-doing skill development. In the current debate on training, some have ar- 
gued that the apparent U.S. training deficit is the result of our relative reliance 
on informal on-the-job training. Cross-country comparisons that use data on 
formal training, the argument goes, will underestimate the actual amount of 
training that occurs in the United States. In chapter 5 of this volume Weiss uses 
a unique data set from the United States: new-hire output in three electronics 
assembly plants that have no formal training programs in place for new hires 
is monitored over a six-to-eight-month period. Even in the absence of formal 
training programs, Weiss shows that the U.S. system of informal learning-by- 
doing generates rapid productivity growth during the first month of employ- 
ment. However, six months later there is little evidence of any positive produc- 
tivity changes associated with learning-by-doing. This finding suggests that 
overreliance on informal training may be one reason for our lower productivity 
growth in the United States. 
So how do more formal training programs affect the productivity of firms? 
This is the key question in much of the current policy debate on training, yet 
there is a dearth of information available. In one study, Bartel (1992), using a 
survey of U.S. manufacturing firms in 1983 and 1986, finds that training pro- 
grams resulted in increases in firm productivity on the order of 17 percent. 
In chapter 6, Bishop provides additional evidence on the relationship be- 
tween training and firm productivity. His work is unique in that it focuses on 
small and medium-sized firms across all sectors of the economy. Bishop exam- 
ines a variety of issues, including the following: Are training costs lower if a 
worker has received relevant training at a school or in a previous job? What 
are the links between employee turnover and previous training? Are firms more 
profitable if they recruit previously trained workers? Is  worker productivity 
higher with more training? Which types of training increase profits the most? 
Which types of training are linked with more innovations? Bishop segments 
training into current on-the-job training, previous relevant employer training 
(both formal and informal), previous “irrelevant” employer training (both for- 
mal and informal), and current and previous off-the-job training. He focuses 
on the experience of new hires within a firm and asks how portable previous 
on-the-job and off-the-job training  is. This study measured productivity by 
asking employers to rate their most recent hire’s  productivity, on a scale of 
0-100,  during the  first two  weeks  of  employment, during the next  eleven 
weeks, and at the time of  the interview. There appear to be sharp differences 
between the returns from formal on-the-job training and from off-the-job train- 
ing, as workers switch employers. Formal on-the-job training received from a 
previous employer has little effect on a worker’s  current wage (as might be 
expected given the absence of certification), but it increases a worker’s current 
productivity by an  estimated 9.5 percent and lowers the amount of training that 
the new firm must give the worker for the worker to do their job. However, if 
the worker receives no additional training from the current employer, the im- 18  Lisa M. Lynch 
pact of training  from a previous employer diminishes  over time. Company- 
sponsored off-the-job training has a more lasting effect on wages, worker pro- 
ductivity, and a measure of innovation; it raises productivity by 16 percent and 
makes workers more innovative on the job. 
In summary, this section suggests that, in the United States, informal train- 
ing, or learning-by-doing, has relatively little impact on longer-term productiv- 
ity growth in a firm (see Weiss, chap. 5),  while more formal training increases 
productivity and a worker’s ability to be innovative (see Bishop, chap. 6). 
Training Outcomes: Returns to Individuals 
Studies using firm-based data provide a great deal of  insight into what re- 
turns firms see from training. However, these studies do not tell us much about 
what returns workers receive, especially if there is a great deal of employee 
mobility, as is the case in the United States. The remaining chapters of the 
book examine the impact of training on individuals’ wages and wage growth 
across countries. While we have household and individual data across coun- 
tries that is more comparable than  our firm-based data, it is still difficult to 
obtain information on a representative sample of individuals in Japan and Ger- 
many. Nevertheless,  this  section does provide  information  on how  training 
affects wages in the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Nor- 
way.  Specifically, it allows us to compare how different types of  training- 
employer-led, government-led, and school-based-seem  to affect wages and 
wage growth, especially those of  new entrants who are not university grad- 
uates. 
Many theories have attempted to explain why  individual wages vary  and 
why wages rise with seniority. Becker (1964) and Mincer (1974) argue that 
starting wages are higher for more highly educated workers since the stock of 
human capital for these workers is higher when they enter the labor market. 
Wages then increase as human capital or skills are acquired either on or off the 
job in formal and/or informal training or through  work experience. Workers 
may acquire two types of training in the work force-general  and firm specific. 
Firm-specific training will raise a worker’s wage as a premium paid to reduce 
turnover, but this premium may not be as large as the premium paid for general 
training,  since by  definition  specific training  is not  easily portable to other 
employers. Therefore, the impact of training on wages will depend in part on 
how specific the training is and in part on who pays for it. 
Until recently, because of data limitations, it has not been possible to directly 
observe the relationship between periods of training and wages. Researchers 
had  been  forced to examine  the links among tenure,  work experience,  and 
wages: they inferred training investments from the coefficients on tenure and 
experience. Unfortunately,  human capital theory is not the only explanation 
for wages rising with tenure and experience in employment. Theories of job 
matching,  shirking, and turnover  provide  alternative  explanations. However, 19  Introduction 
these models of compensation are not mutually exclusive. To sort out the real 
returns to human capital investments and the specificity of these investments, 
we need longitudinal data on individuals, including data on the timing of  in- 
vestments in human capital and employment and earnings data. Recently U.S. 
researchers have used newly available data to examine this issue. Examples 
include Barron, Black, and Loewenstein (1987), Booth (1991), Brown (1989), 
Lillard and Tan  (1986), Lynch  (1991b,  1992a, 1992b), and Mincer (1983, 
1988). This section of the volume contributes to this growing literature. 
Empirical studies of the returns to training may be affected by selection bias, 
since individuals are not randomly assigned to training. Employers are more 
likely to train workers who seem trainable, and highly motivated individuals 
are more likely to acquire off-the-job training. Therefore, estimates of the re- 
turns to training may  be biased upward unless the observed and unobserved 
characteristics of those who receive training are properly controlled for. Heck- 
man  and Robb (1986) summarize alternative ways  to address this selection 
bias. Several of the papers described below, which use longitudinal data, adopt 
one of the empirical strategies summarized by  Heckman and Robb (1986) to 
control for time-invariant, unobserved individual characteristics in the returns 
to training. 
The discussion of selection bias highlights how important it is to understand 
the characteristics of  those in training. For instance, in the United States the 
determinants of receiving company-provided training for non-college-graduate 
youths include years of schooling, being white and male, and being covered by 
a union contract (Lynch 1992b). Women and minorities are more likely to have 
participated in off-the-job training provided by  for-profit proprietary institu- 
tions than in company training. The link between schooling and postschool 
training in the United States means that dropping out of high school lowers 
not only starting wages but also the long-term career prospects of workers. 
In many European countries it is difficult for youths to reenter the educa- 
tional system once they have  decided to stop their studies. However, in  the 
United States, even for high school dropouts it is possible to “get back on 
track” even after many years out of school. In chapter 7 Cameron and Heckman 
use the detailed information available in the U.S. National Longitudinal Survey 
Youth Cohort (NLSY) to examine the factors influencing decisions to invest in 
additional schooling and training. In particular, they look at the impact of drop- 
ping out of  high  school, high  school graduation, and GED certification on 
young males’ subsequent academic and nonacademic schooling and training 
choices. The GED certificate, administered by  the private sector, allows high 
school dropouts to obtain, through examination, a certificate of  high school 
equivalency. While previous work by Cameron and Heckman has shown that 
GED recipients are not equivalent to high school graduates in the probabil- 
ity that they will attend college, this paper shows that GED recipients are 
more likely to obtain additional private-sector training than are noncertified 
high school dropouts. Their work also shows that youths from families with 20  Lisa M. Lynch 
lower incomes are more likely to participate in formal off-the-job vocational 
training. 
Blanchflower  and Lynch (chap. 8) compare two similar cohorts of  young 
U.S. and British workers who are not college graduates and who acquire their 
training from different  sources. They document  differences  across the  two 
countries in the incidence of training and then look at the impact this training 
has on wages and wage growth. They also examine how the decision in the 
1980s by the U.K.  government to revamp youth training has affected the qual- 
ity of the training provided. While the labor markets in the United States and 
Great Britain  are structured differently, Blanchflower  and Lynch argue that 
there  are  more  similarities between  these  two  countries  than  between  the 
United States and Germany or between the United States and Japan. 
Blanchflower  and  Lynch  find  significant  wage  gains  associated  with 
employer-provided  training in the United States. As in Lynch (1992b), cur- 
rent employer-provided  training raises wages of U.S. workers, while previous 
employer-provided training has little impact. Traditional apprenticeship train- 
ing programs in Great Britain also raise wages, but not by the same amount as 
apprenticeship programs in the United States. The primary difference in train- 
ing, however, is in its incidence: British youths are much more likely to obtain 
postschool training than their U.S.  counterparts. This gap is highest for males: 
British males are twice as likely to receive postschool training as US.  males. 
A second difference lies in the certification of skills. While the gains associated 
with completing an apprenticeship are significant but small in Great Britain, 
gains are much higher if the apprentice also passes a nationally  recognized 
qualification exam. Such exams do not exist in the United States. 
The paper goes on to examine what happened in Britain in the 1980s when 
the government  decided  to restructure training for youths by  abolishing the 
traditional apprenticeships program and switching to a government-led youth 
training program.  Youth training became  shorter in duration, and as a result 
young people were less likely to pass vocational qualification exams. In chap- 
ter 9, Dolton, Makepeace, and Treble examine the impact of this training re- 
form  on  young  workers’  wages.  They  look  at  the  impact  on  wages  of 
government-led  training and compare it with the impact of  training acquired 
on the job or off the job from the private sector. Government training alone has 
small or even negative effects on young workers’ wages. However, on-the-job 
training provided by an employer and off-the-job training  obtained from the 
private sector both have a significant impact on wages. The wage gains associ- 
ated with the youth training scheme seem to be lower than the wage gains from 
the traditional apprenticeship system it replaced, as shown by  Blanchflower 
and Lynch. This change may reflect significant alterations in the content of the 
training program, which are also implied by the lower pass rates for vocational 
qualifications  exams.  In  summary,  the  papers  by  Blanchflower  and  Lynch 
(chap. 8) and Dolton et al. (chap. 9) provide some interesting documentation 21  Introduction 
of what happened in one country, the United Kingdom, when it attempted to 
alter the delivery system for the provision of training for young workers. 
The volume concludes with chapters by Elias, Hernaes, and Baker (chap. 
10) and by Groot, Hartog, and Oosterbeek (chap. 11). The contributions pro- 
vide additional estimates of the wage gains associated with training in Britain, 
Norway, and the Netherlands. Elias et al. examine whether vocational  skills 
obtained from a school-based system that is de-linked from the demand for 
labor provide a lower rate of return than skills obtained through an employer- 
based system. They use the same data on Britain that Blanchflower and Lynch 
use (although they examine a more restricted sample), and they use longitudi- 
nal  data on youths  in  Norway. They consider the pre-1980s  apprenticeship 
scheme in Britain as an example of employer-based training; Norway, in con- 
trast, has relied on school-based vocational training. As do Blanchflower and 
Lynch, they find significant wage gains associated with completing an appren- 
ticeship in Britain; they find no discernable gains from school-based training 
in Norway. The results from Norway are similar to findings in the United States 
that school-based vocational education has low returns. 
While it is difficult to obtain data on individual workers to estimate the re- 
turns to training for apprentices in Germany, the returns to training in the Neth- 
erlands (which has a training system similar to Germany’s), as shown by Groot 
et al., are high. In the Netherlands there are numerous training funds, jointly 
administered by unions and employers, especially designed to assist small and 
medium-sized  firms to train their workers. Youths in the Netherlands receive 
training that has a large component of workplace training, in addition to school 
training, and the training is linked to employment in a firm. In chapter 11 Groot 
et al. show that wage gains associated with firm-provided training are on the 
order of 4-16  percent. In other work, Groot (1993) has found that productivity 
in firms that have formal training programs is  11-20  percent higher than in 
similar firms without training. 
In summary, significant wage gains are associated with employer-provided 
training. These gains are larger than those associated with school-based voca- 
tional training. In addition, gains from employer-provided training are larger if 
they are associated with passing nationally recognized vocational qualification 
exams. Having employers provide training  seems to increase the probability 
that it will be demand related, while certifying skills through a nationally rec- 
ognized process increases the portability of skills as well as worker willingness 
to accept lower wages during periods of general training. 
Conclusion 
This volume demonstrates that employer-provided  training creates signifi- 
cant gains for both workers and firms. Productivity  is higher in firms with a 
better-trained work force, and wages are higher for individuals who acquire 22  Lisa M. Lynch 
Table 8  Returns to Training in the United States (%) 
Type of Training  Firm Productivity  Wages 
Informal Learning-by-Doing 
Formal Training 






Rapid increase, then flat or falling 
(Weiss), chap. 5 in this 
volume) 
17 (Bartel 1992) 
16 (Bishop, chap. 6 in this 
volume) 
9.5 (Bishop, chap. 6 in this 
volume) 
Mimics productivity 
gains (Weiss, chap. 5 
in this volume) 
7 (Lynch 1992b) 
11 (Lillard and Tan  1986) 
4.4 (Mincer 1988) 
4.7 (Holzer 1989) 
0 (Lynch 1992b) 
0 (Bishop, chap. 6 in this 
5 (Lynch 1992b) 
volume) 
13 (Lynch 1992b; 
Blanchflower and 
Lynch, chap. 8 in this 
volume) 
postschool training, especially general training. Estimates of these returns to 
training  for firms  and  individuals  in  the  United  States  are  summarized  in 
table 8. 
As can be seen in table 8, after training periods, individuals earn substan- 
tially more, and firms appear to experience even larger increases in their pro- 
ductivity. We return, then, to a question raised earlier. If the returns to training 
are so high, why isn’t  everybody training? The best answer we have is that 
different systems are more or less successful in overcoming potential market 
failures in the provision of  general training and that it is difficult for single 
firms to move unilaterally from one training system to another. The papers in 
this volume provide some insight into the variety of institutional arrangements 
that appear to provide general training more successfully. 
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